In social networks humans are generally benefited by maintaining friendships and community affiliation in which factors like homophily play key roles. These networks are far from being static, rather they are continually transforming or evolving as people from time to time decide to make new friendships and dissociate themselves from old ones. There is an element of risk in dissociations from friendships or group affiliations, especially when the decision to dissociate is done with limited information. In an experiment in the form of a cooperative game with human players we investigate the formation of groups and measure the perception of risk. In the game, the players set initially to a small world network and having limited information of its structure, coordinate their movements to form the groups. We also study the local coordination between players using a data-driven model of agents based on probability matching. Our results show that the pace of group formation is mainly dependent on local information processing of players. We find that humans even in limited information processing environments show optimal perception of risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals in any society are found to be in closely knit groups or communities due to social attraction based on culture, political ideologies, hobbies, or sets of skills they share [1] .
Such groups are known to act as chambers of collaboration and innovation across various fields of human endeavour like performing arts, science, and technology development [2] [3] [4] [5] .
While it is understood that the social structure is far from being static, the precise dynamics that leads to the formation of groups is not yet understood [6, 7] .
The evolving structure of a social network is closely associated with the dynamics at the level of egocentric networks [8] [9] [10] . From the perspective of an ego (individual) there are both benefits as well as costs that could be associated with such local characteristics as the precise set of alters i.e. the individuals connected to the ego, the strength of the ego-alter ties and the local clustering, as well as the global network characteristics like the centrality and overlapping communities i.e. individuals' simultaneous affiliation to different communities. Based on the trade-off between the benefit and cost, the existing linkages may be discontinued and new linkages may be formed. This is a possible mechanism by which an ego, over a longer time scale changes its network characteristics at the local and global scales [11] . Inadvertently, this kind of dynamics at the level of individuals results in a reorganization of the whole network [12] [13] [14] .
In a cooperative game of human subjects playing on a network with a certain spatial structure, we investigate how large communities can emerge. We use the concept of a connected cluster of nodes as a proxy for a community. A cluster is a group of nodes on a network such that there is at least one path connecting every pair, which exclusively passes through the others in the group. Initially each subject is assigned one of possible colours (red, green, and blue) such that there are equal number of subjects of each colour, set to an initial configuration where the cluster sizes are either one or two. Then the subjects are allowed to navigate on the network in the course of which the subjects are expected to form single connected clusters of each colour. During the rounds of the game the players coordinate their actions in pairs by communicating over the network links, and exchange their locations or node positions. Such exchange of positions can be thought of as a result of two processes known to exist in real-world social networks, i.e., severing old links and establishing new ones. Although in a real social network links could get added in the presence of existing ones, this facet is not included in the current game. The exchange introduces an element of risk in the game, such that a player is at risk of getting dissociated from its current group, if he or she decides to relocate. In some cases such decisions originate from the need to help the other players in navigating the network. In this study our goal is to uncover how in the course of the game, the information available to the players is utilized by them as well as to quantify their risk behaviour.
Our experiments are done in the spirit of the earlier works by Kearns et al. (see [15] and references there in). In series of experiments they studied the effect of network structure on the efficiency of solving problems like the graph coloring and consensus by human subjects [16, 17] . In our game experiment we focus on the problem of complex decision making by human players linked with others in a network, where the players have information at the local and global scale, i.e. colours of their neighbours and cluster sizes, respectively. In addition to the game experiments, we have performed modelling of the decision making process in a similar configuration set-up in order to quantify the perception of risk by the players. This is expected to give us insight into the situations where excessive caution by the players would hinder their mobility and aggregation behaviour towards group formation.
On the other hand the lack of prudence or cautiousness could allow the groups getting fragmented, which has been studied in a different but related context of matching game, see [18] . Finally, we use our model to scan the parameter space and compare other possible strategies with the strategy employed by humans.
II. RESULTS

A. Experiment
Subjects playing the game are grouped into m classes having l individuals in each class, such that in sum there are n = ml individuals. A class is denoted by a colour, e.g., red, blue, green, etc. The game is played on a connected network of n nodes. Each one of the n nodes of the network is occupied by only one player, hence there are no empty nodes in the network. The goal of the experiment requires that by swapping places during successive rounds, players end positioned on the network with m clusters each of size l. A connected red cluster implies that from any red player any other red player can be reached by a connected rnd−03 (7, 4, 6 Within a given cluster (for a given colour) any pair of nodes will have a path exclusively through the nodes belonging to the cluster. The colours attributed to the subjects are shown in the figure. In addition, links that connect the players in a given cluster are marked with the corresponding colour while the other links are shown in gray. Only rounds with odd numbers are shown and denoted by the label 'rnd-'. The largest cluster size for each colour at the end of the corresponding round is indicated as a triplet (S r ,S g ,S b ) with S r , S g , and S b being the largest cluster size corresponding to red, green, and blue, respectively. The network consisted of a regular squared mesh of 6 × 4 = 24 nodes, with periodic boundaries and three small-world links. The average of the largest cluster sizes of the three colours is scaled by the maximum value (8) and expressed as a percentage is also indicated for each round.
near-neighbour path consisting of only red players (see the last network in Fig. 1 ).
The game is played in rounds. A round consists of two distinct stages a player 'requesting' followed by another player 'accepting'. Players of each colour get a chance to be requesters once in every m rounds (i.e. the number of colours). In the requesting stage a requester has an option of requesting one of his or her neighbours to exchange places, provided that he or However, the exchanges occurring after the 15th round allows the players reorganize rather quickly to the desired configuration.
she has a colour different from that of the requester. The other option for the requester is not to send any request and remain in his or her location. In the accepting stage, the players that have received one or more requests, either choose to exchange places with only one requester or to deny the request to remain in his or her location. At the end of every round the configuration of the network would change such that some players would have exchanged their positions. During each round, a player is provided the following information:
(i) The colour of other players in the neighbourhood.
(ii) The size of the player's own cluster.
(iii) The size of the cluster of each of the neighbouring players.
(iv) The largest cluster size for each of the m colours. In general, all the games showed a fast initial growth in the sizes of the largest clusters.
After which the overall activity in terms of requesting and accepting decreased. In this phase 
B. Model
During the game the players take decisions on sending (or not sending) requests and accepting (or not accepting) requests based on the available information of their immediate neighbourhood, and the sizes of the largest clusters of each colour. The decision making logic employed by the agents is expected to be heterogeneous yet far from random. It is known that exact coordination between two agents is possible in the presence of common knowledge [19] . However, in this game the knowledge of a subject and any of its neighbours do not completely overlap. We construct a model that is based on the notion of probability matching [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . This model is expected to serve both the purposes of uncovering the decision making logic of the subjects as well as act as template for agent based simulations.
For any player i having a colour c i we assume that his or her neighbourhood S can be uniquely characterized by the following quantities -(i) the current cluster size s i , (ii) the set of cluster sizes {s j }, where j is a neighbour of i having a colour different from i, that is, c j = c i . We place all the neighbourhoods S that have identical (or can be made identical by the ordering of j's) supersets {s i , {s j }} into a given category C.
In a given category C we consider an agent i with the set of neighbours {j 1 , j 2 , j 3 , ...} that have colours different from i. In the requesting phase it has to choose from the following set of options ω: {stay at current location without sending a request, send a request to j 1 , send a request to j 2 , ...}. We assume that with each option ω the player associates a probability, P ω of it being beneficial to the progress of the game. Here beneficial may refer to an increase in the cluster size for the colour of i, or increase in the cluster size for colour of j, or both.
Therefore, using probability matching, the probability of choosing an option ω is given by,
Restricting ω to the set of options when a request is sent one can write,
where P 0 is the estimated probability that not sending a request (that is, not moving) is a beneficial option.
Next, we focus on different categories that could be realized during the course of the game, and for each category we identify the cases (characterized by neighbours with cluster size s j ) when one or more requests were sent from the focal players i to players j. These sets are indeed options that were actually executed. Thus in each category and for each option send a request to a player having colour of j, so that clusters having colour c j could merge.
There could be better measures of disparity but our choice is guided by the linearity of the model. For the actual fitting instead of U j we use s(c j ) as s j is already an independent variable. Although we base our model of decision making on probability matching, it could as well be considered as a log-linear response model of the kind in [25, 26] .
The fit to a logistic function allows us to use the following expression for a requester,
The fitting parameters are provided in the SM (table S1) . Similarly, using the data from the acceptors we extract the parameters α a , β a , δ a , and λ a . All the parameters turn out to be significantly different from zero with p < 0.01. As we have two sizes for the networks, for the purpose of fitting we use cluster sizes that are scaled by the maximum cluster size, in such a way that the cluster size variable varies between 0 and 1. As can be observed from the table S1, the corresponding parameter values for the two sets (i.e. with 24 players and 30 players)
are mostly indistinguishable within the error bars. Therefore, using the data on all the 9 games we recalculate the coefficients. Using these coefficients we simulate the model. With Interestingly, the fact that for requesters and acceptors the magnitudes of β and δ also overlap within the error margins, could support our initial ansatz about the inclusion of the term U j = s(c j ) − s j , as an independent variable, which would, however, diminish the importance of s j as a separate independent variable. To investigate the importance of such a term, we slightly modify our model by considering the magnitudes of δ r and β r to be equal. We simulate the model by varying δ r (keeping the relation |δ r | = |β r |) while taking the values for the other coefficients from the table S1. The resulting plot is shown in Fig. 4 (left). The plot shows that a larger δ r (and β r ) enhances the performance of the agents.
Similarly, by varying α r in the model we benchmark the perception of risk in the human subjects. Agents in the model are less likely to breakaway from clusters when α r is negative and large. The Fig. 4 (right) shows a region near α r = −5 where the agents perform best.
Remarkably, we find that α r obtained from the experiment coincides with the optimal value. 
III. DISCUSSION
The attitude of individuals as regards to their affiliation to different social groups has been a prominent line of research in social science [27, 28] . In addition, models and experiments based on game theory [29] [30] [31] , especially those based on Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) have been used extensively to study the formation of groups [32] [33] [34] [35] . In the latter paradigm the existence of cooperative ties could lead to the formation of cohesive groups, and the risk arises when players choose to defect. However, in the present framework we interpret risk as an individual player's decision to favour exchanging their current locations. Unlike models based on PD where the payoff matrix would ideally determine the amount of risk, in our case it is the propensity of an individual to relocate depending on his or her current cluster size.
The results from the experiment show in general that human players are able to process complex information about their neighbourhood as well as to take into account his or her cluster size. It appears that that the players understand well the cooperative setting of the game. In order to achieve the desired target the players tend to coordinate their actions such that an exchange is done if it is mutually beneficial. The limited capacity of processing the neighbourhood information is apparent in Fig. 4 (right) . It is found that larger magnitudes of the requester parameters of β r and δ r would have signified a 'wiser' decision making and would have lead to faster progress in the game and better completion rates. However, the fact that the values of the parameters (see SM) are significant with appropriate signs, reflects the rationality in the choice neighbours during the action of request. The values of the acceptance parameters β a and δ a would also signify rationality although most of the times the acceptors receive only one request and the decision is limited to agreeing or disagreeing to exchange places. The fact that a subject would apply his or her mind to decide whether his or her current location is beneficial for the partner, can be considered as a case of impure altruism [36] .
The dynamics of fragmentation and formation of clusters crucially depends on α (the coefficient of cluster size of the focal player, the latter being a requester or an acceptor).
Whereas a negative value of α would make larger clusters stable, an extremely large magnitude would make clusters inactive and render exchanges impossible. Interestingly, Fig. 4 (right) shows that for requesters the value of α r obtained from the experiment coincides with the optimal value predicted from simulations using the model. This kind of balance could result from the cooperative setting, which was well comprehended by the human subjects. This is evidenced from the cluster fragmentation illustrated in the examples shown in Fig. 2 .
Variation in α a does not seem to have much effect. Overall, the parameter values could be reflecting as strategies of human individuals for engaging in coordination when risks are present [37] .
We place the game in the broad contexts of group formation in social networks and technological networks. The experiment illustrates how individuals located on a network and coordinating over links could achieve configurations that would in principle benefit all. In the context of real-world social networks such dynamics would lead to the mutual enhancement of 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital of individuals [38] [39] [40] . In a sense, the notion of a link between two nodes having the same colour is comparable to the notion of an edge in a puzzle graph (representing a compatible idea) in the recent formulation of 'jigsaw percolation' [41] . While an exchange of positions between two individuals is to be understood primarily as simultaneous changes in the social space of the pair, such an activity could also be considered as an exchange of physical locations of two individuals like that in a faculty exchange program between universities. The desired nature of linking in the network with its underlying spatial structure can also be considered relevant in communication networks
where the nodes are autonomous mobile agents establishing peer-to-peer radio network. The theory of cooperative games has been used to design deployment protocols of mobile agents where a coalition of agents would share a certain frequency spectrum [42] .
Our decision making model not only serves the purpose of extracting the behavioural aspects of real human subjects, it allows us to compare other possibilities with respect to the parameter values. Although we do not perform an exhaustive search in the parameter space, we gain sufficient insight into human behaviour when we find faster convergence for some parameters. Our goal in the near future is to perform experiments with artificial agents or "bots" playing with humans [43, 44] where the model can successfully mirror the typicalities of human behaviour. We believe that such studies will assist us in the better design of cooperating human-agent collectives [45] . were provided -(i) an identifier for the node location, and (ii) the cluster size of the neighboring player located at that node (within brackets).
IV. METHODS
We conducted the experiment in a single session, in a computer lab at the Computer Science Department of Aalto University located in Espoo, Finland, on the 9th of August, 2017 with 30 individuals recruited from an online volunteer pool and from advertisements in social media. Following an Ethics and Research Practices document stated by our University, we collected no personal information of the subjects other than a contact email for rewarding purposes. The experiment involved subjects interacting on computer interfaces through an online network to complete the game. The interface and engine of this online game was implemented using oTree framework (Fig. 5 ) [46] . Subjects' view of other workstations was restricted and all communication during the games was forbidden. Consent forms and instructions for the game were printed out and a brief presentation was given to assure that the subjects understood the rules.
During the four-hour session, a total of 9 games were played, consisting of five games with 24 players and four games with 30 players. We ensured that during each of the first 5 games (24-players game), six of the thirty participants would skip exactly one game. For each game, the network consisted of a regular squared lattice (4 × 6 or 5 × 6) with periodic boundary conditions. We had three additional long-ranged links (not resulting in triangulations) to introduce a small-worldness. In every game the positioning of these links were altered. Also the places of subjects at workstations were shuffled between games. The network used in the game can be considered as realization of the Kleinberg model [47] in the limit that small-world links appear independent of distance. The time given to the players to make a decision (either requesting or accepting) was changed with rounds progressing, being 30 seconds during the first 5 rounds and 20 seconds during the rest.
The incentive offered for participating in the experiment were movie tickets, sent to the players by email after the session was completed. The amount of reward was quantified based on the average collective progress (ACP ). For a given game the ACP is defined as the average of the sizes of the largest cluster in each colour normalized by the maximum possible size (either 8 or 10). For a given network topology and initial positioning of subjects we also calculated the quantity ACP rand from simulations where agents play randomly. We obtained a normalized score for each game by scaling ACP with respect to ACP rand and accumulated the total score (S) over 9 games as
To each subject one movie ticket was given for participation and 4 × S (nearest integer) movie tickets were given as reward. we show this by comparing experiment and simulations for the games with 30 players. We observed that in the model the presence of such activity can impact the completion of the games. Requesting (and accepting) activity between players belonging to large clusters could be considered as detrimental if not useless in terms of reaching the solution. In case the large clusters become unstable, the solution might not be reached. Therefore, in the simulations we prevent such requesting actions from taking place. We prohibit any requesting activity between two agents having cluster size larger than 0.6l, where l is the maximum possible value for a cluster size. The effect of such a rule can be investigated by introducing a parameter f in the model such that 1 − f is the probability of allowing such an action.
With f = 0 we have the basic model and with f = 1 such requests are completely forbidden.
In Fig. S2 we show the effect of varying f on the average collective progress (ACP ) and the fraction of games completed. For the results of simulations reported in the main text we take f = 1. Note, that large clusters can still fragment when requests come from smaller clusters.
B. Acceptance in the model
We observed that in the experiment the probability for a player to receive more than 2 requests in a given round was negligible. The dominating case was that of a single request (70%) as can be observed from Fig. S3 . Also, we found that when simultaneously two requests were received, the choice of acceptance by the focal player was not significantly influenced by the cluster sizes of the requesters (Fig. S3, right) . Therefore, we modeled acceptance by fitting our basic model (having the same structure as that of requesting) to the dominating case of one single requests. In the simulations when there were cases of multiple requests we randomly considered one of the requests to be weighed against the decision of not exchanging. 
